More Troops Yesterday -> Lower Readiness Today?
By Kevin
"We never had enough troops on the ground..."Countless times, I've read this type of criticism of the Bush/Rumsfeld tactic of sending in fewer troops to Iraq than many generals wanted. Now, I don't want to get into who is "right" or "wrong" on this matter, or on the morality of invading Iraq in the first place; instead, I'm assuming Iraq had to be invaded, and that the long-term goal is to forcibly democratize and liberate Iraq and the rest of the Middle East.Prior to the war, the Army chief of staff, Gen. Eric K. Shinseki, said publicly that he thought the invasion plan lacked sufficient manpower, and he was slapped down by the Pentagon's civilian leadership for saying so. During the war, concerns about troop strength expressed by retired generals also provoked angry denunciations by Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and Gen. Richard B. Myers, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
We know that Bush/Rumsfeld paid a large price in Iraqi instability for having fewer troops. But I have not seen addressed the question of whether having sent in more troops initially would have actually cost less in the long run, or would have better met long-term objectives.
Note that I cannot answer this question, but I think it must be asked.
I want to point out a tradeoff that many people seem to be ignoring, as if the counterfactual doesn't matter: higher troop levels at the beginning of the invasion would mean much lower average unit personnel readiness today, and that this would make it difficult to operate effectively now and in the future.
I can argue reasonably that if Bush/Rumsfeld had sent in 100,000 more U.S. troops at the beginning of the Iraq invasion--to patrol the streets, secure the borders, etc.--those extra troops would not be in a top readiness category today.
In reality, the troops not sent in actually did later on refresh and replace those who served out their combat tours and those wounded and killed. With a larger invasion, even more reserves would have had to have been called up to replace the initial cohorts. Note that this is not really an arguable point; if a unit is on the ground, in theater, with great likelihood its personnel readiness decreases, without firing a single shot.
The tradeoff is not just "fewer men, more chaos"; it is also "more men, lower readiness". Which is better? Fewer men at the beginning mean a massive degradation of civil society; more men mean it's quieter earlier, but harder to complete the mission during the critical transition period to elections and self-rule. Hence, the strategy of sending in fewer could be justified on grounds that staggering entry into Iraq keeps personnel readiness higher than it would have been; later objectives are given greater weight. The long run goal is better met with a smaller initial footprint.
Of course, one could argue that sending in fewer troops increased the drain on personnel already in theatre, but I don't think those on the ground would agree that their lives are any easier by having more for a longer time. Instead, I think life is easier for troops if they are more frequently sent home, which is far easier to do if there are fresh troops to replace them.
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